Abstract: Served as one of the most widely used wireless air link interfaces, code division multiple access (CDMA) has been identified as a major technique for 3G wireless communications. Here, a new method based on applying encryption algorithm over spreading codes is proposed to improve the security of CDMA. The security produced in this way is primarily associated with the complexity of the employed encryption algorithm. Because the encryption algorithm's security is highly reliable, it is suitable for any kind of data communications. Since the multi-user detection is the inherent characteristic of the CDMA, the multi-user interference must be studied carefully. For this reason, the cross-correlation between outputs of encryption algorithm, causing the multi-user interference, is studied thoroughly. Then, the combination of encrypted and unencrypted M-sequence is used as a spreading code to mitigate the system performance, and the advantage of this combination is considered from the interference level and the security point of view. A compatible algorithm for the key exchange is produced.
Introduction
As people rely more and more on wireless communication networks for critical information transmission, security has become an urgent issue and a bottleneck for new wireless communication services such as wireless mobile Internet and e-commerce [1] . For military communications where information transmission heavily relies on wireless networks (for instance, from aircraft to aircraft, from aircraft to ground control centre and so on), the security and reliability of the wireless communication systems is of number one priority, especially in national defence and emergency response to abrupt enemy attacks. Spread-spectrum systems are often used to protect digital communication from jamming or to preclude undesired reception of the signal. Both of these purposes can only be met if the jammer or undesired receiver does not have knowledge of the spreading code. For this reason, M-sequences are a deficient choice for the spreading code when a high level of security is required [2] .
The main weakness of the wireless communication security system is the simplicity of accessing the communicating signal through the channel. Eavesdroppers can easily place an antenna in the desired field and after demodulation, the message bits can be obtained in the base-band form. If the messages are encrypted, after storing the encrypted messages with some cryptoanalysis methods, he can smear out the original message. Now, if the received radio signal from the wireless channel is spread in a form that the intruder cannot access the de-spread spectrum, and receives only a signal similar to noise; hence, the radio transmission channel is called perfectly secure.
In the current commercial code division multiple access (CDMA) systems, each user's signal is first spread using a code sequence C(t) known as channelisation code spanned over just one symbol or multiple of symbols. The spreading signal is then further scrambled using a pseudo-random sequence L C (t) to randomise the interference and meanwhile makes it difficult for intruder to intercept and detect the transmitted signal. To recover the desired user's signal, one has to know both the user's channelisation code and scrambling code (as shown in Fig. 1 ). This is known as the built-in security feature of CDMA systems. However, the system is fragile to hostile security attacks [3] .
More specifically, the security of the CDMA system mainly relies on the long-code generator that consists of a 42-bit long-code mask that is generated by a 42-bit linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs). The maximum complexity to recover the 42-bit long-code mask is O (2 42 ). However, if eavesdroppers can obtain 42 bits of plaintext -ciphertext pairs, then the long-code mask can be recovered after dropping the transmission on the traffic channel for about 1 s [3, 4] .
In this article, a new method called hidden direct sequence is proposed to enhance the built-in security of CDMA systems by applying the cryptographic algorithm in the channelisation code, that is, at the physical layer.
2
Security enhancement in the CDMA system with encryption hidden within spread-spectrum section
In the CDMA technique, several users spread their signals spectrums in a wide frequency band by a special code with a small chip time that is called direct sequence C(t). These codes must have a little cross-correlation because other signals are considered as detected noise at the receiver end. The cross-correlation of two waveforms is defined by [5] cross-correlation ¼
All M-sequences that generate with LFSR have good cross-correlation properties, but they also produce a weak security system for the eavesdropper to determine the transmitted spread signal.
Therefore in IS-95, CDMA uses the long-code to scramble the signal, and the security is set up in the physical layer. But the available security that is produced by this method is very low and not suitable for data communication when compared with voice communications. In this article, for security enhancement, the model in Fig. 2 is proposed. In this model, every user encrypts a special spreading code (e.g. that is made by the M-sequence generator) with his private key. These encrypted codes are then used as the spreading code in the channelisation section. At destination, the receiver who knows his private key is able to regenerate the spreading code to de-spread the transmitted signal (i.e. generation of de-channelisation code), hence decryption of his messages.
On the other hand, by this proposed method, the security is related to the encryption algorithm, not the LFSR security. If a proper algorithm such as RC5, IDEA or any block cipher algorithm is chosen, then a desired privacy can be achieved [6, 7] .
3
Study of multi-user interference caused by cross-correlation between encrypted codes
The major point in a CDMA detection process employing multi-user algorithms is the investigation of crosscorrelation of the encrypted codes. This means that the large cross-correlation between codes can make a large interference for any other users at the receiving end.
Consider the schematic model of a synchronous transmitterreceiver in Fig. 3 . In this figure, w 1 is estimated by a synchroniser, where
The output of the sampler is a random variable in the
where h is an additive white Gaussian noise, T the bit time interval, P the transmitted power and I the effect of interference from other (J 2 1) network users. The probability distribution function for I, that is, the summation of different I j , is very difficult to solve in a closed form. The interference I is computed from
To compute any I j independently, we can write [8] 
In this equation, t j is the time delay causing the channel phase fluctuation, where
. m is an integer, T c the chip time interval and g j a random variable with a uniform distribution between 21 and 1. The parameters b 0 ( j) and b 21 ( j) are two consecutive bits of interfering signals, and w j is the receiver's oscillator random phase. (3) is proportional to the partial crosscorrelation in the forms of is the sum of partial I j therefore
When interference for E 1 [C 1 (t)] is under investigation, the total I in (4) can be considered as assuming an average of the cross-correlation between E K 1 [C 1 (t)] and any of E K j [C j (t)]'s. This is obtained by giving a weight value to information bits, for example, b j and b j21 . Hence, the encrypted codes will have the property that the average of the cross-correlation of any encrypted code with any other code becomes considerably small. The cross-correlation between periodic encrypted sequence can be defined as
where
and E K j bC j (t)c are the encryption functions of C i (t) and C j (t), with K i and K j as their associated keys respectively. If the encrypted sequence has M 00 bits, then the cross-correlation between encrypted codes can be written in the following form
and that
In (6), E k i C i (t) and E k j C j (t) are the bipolar outputs of the cryptographic algorithm and are random sequences of þ1 and 21 (0's in the output of cryptography algorithm mapped to 21 and 1's mapped to þ1).
The random variable, R 00 ij , is a weighted summation of independent random variables of g ij (m)'s. According to the central limit theorem, by increasing the length of the encrypted sequence, R 00 ij that is defined in (6) is a random variable that approaches the Gaussian distribution [9] . This distribution function has mean m ¼ 0 and variance s 2 ¼ 1=M 
For the study of cross-correlation between encrypted codes, computer simulations are done for the M-sequences with lengths M 00 ¼ 64, 128, 256 and 512, with the results as shown in Fig. 4 .
To study and compute the multi-user interference, the model in Fig. 5 is proposed, in which I 00 is the interference that is caused by cross-correlations between the private sequence used by the current user and the other (N 2 1) users
where b i (t) is a random variable with a discrete uniform distribution function with two values of þ1 and 21. This distribution has m b i ¼0 and s b i 2 ¼ 1. Distribution function of R 00 is given by (8) . Therefore the random variable z i ðtÞ ¼ b i ðtÞR 00 ij has a distribution function in the following form
Random variable I 00 (t) is a summation of random variables z i such as
Since Z i 's are i.i.d. random variables, hence the variance of I 00 becomes
To compare the multi-user interference caused by the encrypted sequence with that caused by the M-sequence, the model of Fig. 6 is proposed
In Fig. 6 , I 0 is the interference caused by the crosscorrelations between the M-sequence used by the current user and M-sequences that are allocated for other users. Since the cross-correlation between M-sequences is a deterministic value of 1/M 0 , then by defining According to the central limit theorem, if the number of users is sufficiently large, random variable I 0 will have a Gaussian distribution function, but I 00 is always a Gaussian random variable, because the distribution of R 00 ij is Gaussian.
Comparing (12) and (14), it can be observed that for a specific length of a spread sequence, the multi-user interference power in the case of the use of encrypted code is also increased. Thus, the produced encrypted system provides a stochastically independent output with a low correlation, but not lower than that produced by the M-sequence cross-correlation.
BER performance of proposed method in an AWGN channel
With the use of encrypted sequences as spreading codes in an AWGN and multi-user channel shown in Fig. 4 , the computer simulation is performed and results obtained.
In the performed computer simulation, to cancel the dependency of BER results on the chosen keys, an averaging over different keys is employed. The simulation results given in Fig. 4 show that the correlation value between the encryption algorithm outputs is completely random. The value of this correlation is dependent upon the selected keys and the encryption algorithm inputs. With the assumption that the inputs to the encryption algorithm are fixed, if the keys are chosen randomly, it becomes obvious that the correlation between the encrypted codes may become a large value. However, the probability of chosen keys that produces low correlation between the encrypted codes exists. For achieving the real result, the computer simulation is repeated many times, in which the keys are chosen randomly for each repetition. The BER performance would have the average value as shown in Figs. 7 and 8. Fig. 7 shows the BER performance when the number of users is increased. The performance of error probability with the increase in the length of the encrypted sequences can be observed as shown in Fig. 8 . The result of the multi-user AWGN channel simulation when the M-sequences are employed as a channelisation code is shown in Fig. 9 .
As it can be observed in Fig. 8 , with the increased encrypted code length, the BER plot is improved. This shows that the interference between the users (between the encrypted codes) is inversely proportional to the length of the encrypted sequences. According to (14), this proportionality for the M-sequence with length M 0 is 1/M 0 2 and for the encrypted codes, considering the simulation results and (12), can be proved to be proportional to 1/M 00 . It must be emphasised that the error probability results given in Figs. 7 -9 are obtained without considering the use of the filter for the rejection of out-of-band interference [10] . The reason for this assumption is that the result to be independent of filter choice. Therefore because of no use of the interference rejection filter, the improved results observed in Figs. 8 and 9 are not from the increase of gain process, but only from the cross-correlation power decrease against the auto-correlation power, and hence the reduction in the multi-user interference level. Comparing Figs. 8 and 9, it can be observed that by using the encrypted bits instead of M-sequence bits the amount of multi-user interference is increased, and if the encrypted bits alone are used for the spreading codes, the BER plot becomes degraded. But by considering the cross-correlation between the encrypted sequences dependent upon the key bits and the input sequence bits, and with proper management and selection of suitable keys, the value of the crosscorrelation between the encrypted sequences is reduced and thus a better BER plot can be achieved.
For mitigating the BER result, a combination of un-encrypted and encrypted sequences can be used. If the keys are chosen completely random and no special algorithm for the optimum key selection to decreasing the interference level is provided, with the addition of the un-encrypted M-sequence to the encrypted spreading sequences, a better result is obtained. This is shown in Fig. 10 .
If the combination of M-sequence bits and encrypted bits are employed, the interference is divided into two portions. The first portion becomes dependent upon the crosscorrelation between M-sequences and the second portion becomes dependent upon the interference from the crosscorrelation of the encrypted codes.
In this case, the spreading sequence has M bits whose M 0 bits are M-sequence and the other M 00 bits are private codes, that is
Therefore the interference that is caused by the multi-user is
According to (12) and (14), the reason for this improved result can be explained by the reduction in the interference level between the codes with relations 1/M 0 2 and 1/M (Fig. 11) , whereas according to Fig. 12 the results for security are the same for 63 þ 64, 127 þ 128, 255 þ 256 and 511 þ 512. Thus we can conclude that by increasing M 0 and M 00 simultaneously, the performance of the system is enhanced. Fig. 13 shows how the interference is generated and affects the system when the combination of M-sequence and encrypted sequence is used.
5
Synchronisation and key exchange between the mobile user terminals and the base station
In order to connect the user handset to the base station, initially we need to synchronise the spreading sequence. After synchronisation, the exchange of the key will take place. The synchronisation process here is the same as the synchronisation used in the CDMA system, which used only the M-sequence to spread the spectrum. The transmitter uses C(t), which is one of the 2 m 21 M-sequences. In the synchronization process, the receiver creates Cðt ÀtÞ wheret is an estimation of the propagation delay between the receiver and the transmitter (t). After the synchronisation, which can be accomplished by a special synchronisation algorithm [10] , the key exchange process will take place. For example, we can use the encrypted key exchange algorithm [11] . In this protocol, mobile user terminal i has the individual secret key (K i ) that is only known by the BTS. This process is shown in Fig. 14 and described as follows:
1. The mobile user terminal sends its own identification number (C A ) to the BTS. 2. The BTS uses the identification number to find the secret key of the mobile user terminal (K A ). Then the BTS generates a random public key and a private key (K public and K private ). Then the BTS encrypts K public using a symmetric algorithm with the K A (E K A (K public )) and finally sends it to the mobile user terminal. 3. The mobile user terminal (which knows K A ) decrypts the message to extract K private . Then it generates a random session key (K ) and a random string (R A ) and encrypts them using K private , which the mobile user terminal had received from the BTS. The mobile user terminal sends E K public (K, R A )) to the BTS. 4. The BTS decrypts the message with its own private key (K private ) to obtain K and R A . Then, BTS generates another random string (R B ) and encrypts both strings, R A and R B , with K and sends the result (E K (R A , R B )) to the mobile user terminal. 5. The mobile user terminal decrypts the message to extract R A and R B . If the obtained R A is the same as the R A that it sent to the BTS in step (3), the mobile user terminal encrypts R B with K and sends to the BTS the value of (E K (R B )), otherwise determines that the BTS is not valid and terminates the negotiation process. 6. The BTS decrypts the message to extract R B . If the obtained R B is the same as R B that is sent to the mobile user terminal in step (4), the BTS allows the connection to be established between the mobile user terminal and itself. They now communicate using K as the session key, otherwise the BTS recognises that the mobile user terminal is not a valid user and terminates the negotiation process. After agreeing on the session key, the BTS sends the bits of sequence C(t) as an encrypted message with K A to the mobile user terminal.
The mobile user terminal then can guess the t delay since it has the correct estimate forĈðtÞ, which has been received during the synchronisation process. Now both the transmitter and the receiver will attempt to construct EC(t) (where E K [C(t)] ¼ EC(t)) using the session key (K).
The transmitter attaches the EC(t) sequence to the end of the M-sequence, and the receiver will also add exactly the same confidential bits to the end of the Cðt Àt Þ sequence. Since the encrypted bits are added to the end of the Cðt Àt Þ sequence without any time gap, the propagation delay will affect the confidential sequence as well (Fig. 15) . Thus, the synchronisation for the confidential bits has taken place.
Conclusions
In this article, a new method named hidden direct sequence is proposed to enhance the built-in security of CDMA systems by applying the cryptographic algorithm in the channelisation code. This article introduces a secure spectrum-spreading method that dismantles eavesdroppers from hearing the transmitted message. As they cannot de-spread and store the transmitted radio signal, they can not attack with most powerful means. The only way for eavesdroppers to determine the original message is to examine 2 n key combinations of encrypted sequences when the signal is passing through the channel: for an encryption algorithm of 128 key bits, this operation needs the attack power of 2 128 repetitions, which is almost impossible. Therefore the implemented security produced in this way is quite different with the encrypted message bits method. Indeed, one can combine the two methods and produce even much better secure link.
Moreover, the performance of the encrypted code that uses the un-encrypted M-sequence together with the directsequence spread-spectrum section of the CDMA system shows a very good follow-up with the BPSK un-coded system when the multi-user detection algorithm was utilised. In this way, uncertainty is obtained when a wrong key is employed, that is, the system security is guaranteed.
As observed, with the increase in the number of encrypted bits, the interfering power caused by cross-correlation between these bits decreases with relation 1/M 00 . Also, with the increase in the number of un-encrypted bits, the interfering power between un-encrypted bits decreases with relation 1/M 0 2 . Hence, with the increase in the joint un-encrypted and encrypted bits, the interference in general is reduced. This is proved by the simulation's results too. On the other hand, the joint increase in the number of encrypted and un-encrypted bits also guarantees security, and the BER will increase if the number of encrypted bits is also increased.
Using the symmetric key encryption algorithm, a point-to-point communication can provide a classified link when this method is used. With the use of the public key algorithm, one can also obtain encrypted sequences, and in the multi-cast communication link, with the use of this idea, the source identity can be obtained. The public key algorithm together with this idea can produce higher confidentiality as well as security when transmission takes place from multi-point to the central station. 
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